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Information Academic Journals Black Mischief: Crime, Protest and Resistance in Colonial Kenya
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The Historical Journal, 36, 4 (1993), pp. 851-877 Copyright © 1993 Cambridge University Press BLACK MISCHIEF: CRIME, PROTEST AND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL KENYA* DAVID M. ANDERSON School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London abstract. This article examines the history of African resistance to colonial rule among the Nandi and Kipsigis peoples of Kenya's Western Highlands. Anti-colonial protest centred on the activities of a group of ritual leaders', the orkoiik of the Talai clan, who were believed to possess supernatural powers of prophecy and divination. Between the late i8gos and igoj, the orkoiyot Koitalel had come to prominence as a leader of resistance to conquest. After his defeat the British briefly attempted to harness his Talai clansmen to the system of colonial government, promoting them as chiefs. This move was based upon a misunderstanding of the status of the orkoiik, whose powers often stood in direct conflict with the authority of the elders and who were greatly feared by many Nandi and Kipsigis. By the ig20s the orkoiik were deeply implicated in much criminal activity, especially the theft of livestock from European settler farmers. On three occasions orkoiik attempted to organize armed risings. The article concludes with a discussion of the place of the orkoiik in the historiography of Kenya. Although Koitalel and Barserion are commonly presented as heroes of a glorious resistance to colonialism, it is suggested that this interpretation fails to reflect the deep ambiguity of the status of the orkoiik, and the complexity of the struggles that took place within African societies under colonial rule. On a near-moonless night in June 1934, a group of eight Africans entered the compound of a European-owned farm in the Kinangop area of Naivasha District, Kenya Colony. The farm was the home of Alex and Stella Semini, a settler couple who had only been farming in the district for the past year. The intention of their African visitors was burglary: the theft of money, firearms and ammunition. Why these interlopers selected the Semini farm is unclear, but their simple burglary was to go horribly wrong, with consequences they could not have foreseen. The burglars clumsily disturbed the family from their sleep, and when Alex Semini went on to the porch to investigate, a struggle ensued. In the general melee Alex Semini was speared and then beaten while he lay injured, and Stella Semini assaulted. Hearing the Seminis' farm labourers coming to investigate the commotion, the African interlopers made * I am grateful to Roy Foster, John Lonsdale, Joseph Miller, Terence Ranger, Neal Sobania, Ed Steinhart and Richard Waller for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to seminar groups at the University of Cambridge, University of Minnesota, and the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, whose constructive criticisms helped to shape the ideas presented here. 851 852 DAVID M. ANDERSON their escape into the night, taking with them some of their booty but leaving behind pieces of clothing and personal possessions dislodged in the fracas. These would later be crucial items of evidence in the apprehension and conviction of the criminals. Dazed and in a state of shock, Stella Semini bundled her husband into the family car, and the couple managed to manoeuvre the vehicle over the two miles to the nearest neighbouring farm. Alex Semini passed into a coma later that night, and survived for the next three weeks, before finally succumbing to his wounds.1 News of the 'Kinangop Outrage', as these events came to be known, caused an immediate furore among the settlers of Naivasha and quickly became a matter of debate and concern throughout Kenya's White Highlands.2 Rumours that Stella Semini had been sexually assaulted fuelled the 'Black Peril' anxieties of the white settler community. The response of the police and the administration was accordingly rapid and intense, and within days the first of a series of arrests was made. The police had identified the culprits as being Kipsigis, a people whose home reserve lay some ioo miles to the west of Kinangop, beyond the Mau escarpment (Fig. i). A small number of Kipsigis - less than ioo - were employed on farms in the Naivasha district, but none of those eventually charged with the murder of Alex Semini was found to be a resident of Naivasha (although one had previously been employed on the Semini farm).3 The Kipsigis people, along with their neighbours the Nandi, had long been stigmatized in European perceptions as habitual cattle thieves and were commonly portrayed as the most 'criminally' inclined of all Kenya's African peoples. That reputation had taken on a more sinister tone as attacks on the property and person of European settlers and Asian traders in the Western Highlands had steadily increased from 1928, reaching proportions which generated considerable alarm among sometimes over-anxious settlers and calmer colonial officials alike by 1933. Over this period thefts of livestock, money and firearms, which had initially been concentrated on the European farms in the immediate vicinity of the Kipsigis reserve, gradually increased and spread over an ever-widening area. In the interpretation of the colonial government, the 'Kinangop Outrage' conformed to this wider pattern of criminal activity involving the Kipsigis (and to a lesser extent their other Kalenjin neighbours). 1 This account is
based upon the trial papers. Criminal Case 123 (1934), Rex. v. Kibet
arap 2 'Report of public meeting of
Naivasha Farmers' Association', 2 July 1934, KNA [Kenya 3 Criminal Case 123 (1934), trial transcript, CO 533/481/1.
Fig. 1. Central and western Kenya. Investigation of this spiralling pattern of lawlessness led, in the early months of 1934, to the revelation that much of this crime was 'organized', and that a particular section of the Kipsigis people were its principal instigators. Responsibility for this 'lawlessness' was attributed to the activities of the male members of the Talai clan, known by the Kalenjin term orkoiik (sing, orkoiyot), who were believed to possess ritual and supernatural powers. The 'Kinangop Outrage' was believed to have been instigated by one of these ritual experts. By the time of the trial of the seven Africans accused of the murder of Alex Semini, the colonial administration had become convinced that the 'witchcraft' of the Kipsigis orkoiik had been turned towards crime, and that much of that criminal activity was deliberately directed against the authority of the government.4 The victims of these crimes included African chiefs and their agents as well as Europeans and Asians, and the colonial authorities came to realize that some of these incidents had a political significance that 4 Governor Byrne to secretary of state, 3 May 1934, CO 533/441/i, summarizes the findings of the government inquiry into the activities of the orkoiik. 854 DAVID M. ANDERSON went beyond simple accumulation: crimes against colonial laws, protest against colonial authorities, and ultimately the aim of a general armed resistance were seen to be linked in a serious challenge to colonial rule in the Western Highlands. The murder of Alex Semini, coming just as the Nairobi administration was debating how to deal with the threat posed by these African 'gangsters', contributed significantly to the decision to take the drastic and unparalleled action of deporting the entire Talai clan from the Kipsigis Reserve and detaining them indefinitely in an alien and inhospitable area of Nyanza province in what was, in effect, an open prison.5 The 'outrage' on the Semini farm was part of white Kenyan history (and later its mythology). It can also be too easily adopted into nationalist historiography as part of a tradition of resistance in which the leading orkoiik have a heroic role. But Kenya has many histories; what historians think (or once thought) important may not be what their subjects were most concerned with. All African societies had their internal conflicts, which are revealed only tangentially and perhaps misleadingly in their brushes with colonial authority. This is a case study of trying to see through the misperceptions which our inherited historiography has imposed upon us. What mattered to the Kalenjin was male generational conflict over livestock resources and access to the various forms of political and moral authority which underwrote, or patronized, household strategies of accumulation, stock management and alliance. All this was problematic, even threatening, to those involved: disease, drought, enmity had to be combated. There were different, even conflicting means of doing so. There was the 'normal' authority of elders, exercising conÂtrol through seniority and the manipulation of kin and herds: and there were two forms of'abnormal' (and to varying degrees, abhorrent) means of insurÂance and seeking advantage. One was everyday witchcraft, available to all who were malignantly inclined. There were also the 'prophetic' or divinatory powers available only to the most senior and most proficient orkoiik, powers which could most successfully be invoked and harnessed during moments of high social drama, when society was challenged from outside or when its own mechanics of social change, such as the age-sets that regulated the relationships between generations, went through contested processes of transition. We have to understand 'resistance', if we are to understand it as part of African, rather than merely colonial, history, as an external manifestation of this deeper rhythm of social life. And these rhythms changed as colonial rule created the possibility of a new moral order - ultimately to be shaped by those elders who grasped the opportunities of Christianity, who accepted the political authority of the new state, and who turned their energies to economic gain in an increasingly agricultural (rather than cattle-keeping) economy. This new 5 'The Laibons Removal Ordinance' (no. 32 of 1934), was initially drafted and put before the Colonial Office in May 1934. The amended ordinance became law on 25 Sept. 1934, Laws of Kenya, 194.8 (Nairobi, 1948), Cap. 46. Comments on the provisions of this legislation are to be found among the papers in CO 533/481 /i. The term 'gangster' was employed by the prosecuting counsel in the Semini case, none other than Attorney-General William Harrigan, in his opening remarks to the court. Criminal Case 123 (1934), trial transcript, p. 4, CO 533/481/i. GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 855 world was inevitably built at the cost of the authority of the orkoiik, whose powers were intrinsically linked to older social patterns, and whose success depended upon the exploitation of the ambitions of younger men with as yet no household (and thus no moral authority) to their name. This essay is about the ways in which the struggles of the orkoiik to adapt to the new rhythms of the colonial world were and have been perceived, and about the importance of such perceptions in shaping our views of villains and heroes in the colonial past. Laibons, orkoiik and witchcraft We must begin by dealing with the definition of certain terms and categories. The Kipsigis and the Nandi are sections of the broader group now known as the Kalenjin, and in earlier ethnographic literature referred to as the ' Nandi-speaking peoples'.6 Among Kalenjin the term orkoiyot refers to the male members of specific clans, who are attributed with a variety of supernatural powers. Orkoiyot was not an 'office', and there was no automatic legitimacy for any person to claim to be the 'paramount' or 'senior' orkoiyot. The status of an orkoiyot depended entirely upon reputation, and that in turn depended upon the fulfilment of prophecy, success in rain-making and divination, the acknowledged efficacy of medicines, and so on. Each practising orkoiyot operated within a limited geographical area, which might contract or expand with his reputation. However, certain orkoiyot were believed to hold greater powers, and people came from much further afield to consult such a person. These individuals also took a prominent role in rituals and ceremonies with a deeper significance for the wider community, most notably those involving the transitional phases of age-sets.7 The powers of the orkoiyot were believed to be hereditary; that is to say, they were thought to possess mental powers that were passed through the lineage. You could not learn to be an orkoiyot: you were born one. All male members of specific clans among the Nandi and Kipsigis were, by definition, orkoiyot. But it was recognized that though all had inherited the powers, only some would be able to use them. This ambiguity as to the 'redistribution' of powers through each generation led to rivalry and competition within immediate family groups, most frequently between cousins, but sometimes also between brothers and half-brothers. If you were born the son of a well-respected and 6 C. W. Hobley, Eastern Uganda: an ethnological
survey (Anthropological Institute, occasional 7 Huntingford, Nandi of Kenya, pp. 38-52;
Peristiany, Social institutions, passim; Orchardson, 31 HIS 36 856 DAVID M. ANDERSON powerful orkoiyot, the public perception was that you had a higher probability of inheriting similar powers. Rivalries within lineages were matched by those between lineages, as each struggled for pre-eminence within the clan. Less obviously, this led to a degree of Active kinship: on the one hand, younger and aspiring orkoiik used their relationship to senior and highly regarded clansmen as a form of legitimation (and such patronage was an important aspect of the political domain exercised by leading orkoiik); on the other, the wider public commonly assumed kinship between successive generations of powerful orkoiik. The colonial authorities described the practices of the orkoiik (and laibons) as a form of witchcraft, and troublesome individuals were often prosecuted under the witchcraft ordinance.8 This seems straightforward enough from the perspective of the colonial administration, but is both confused and confusing when explored from the perspective of the Kalenjin. Witchcraft (ponisiet), as Nandi and Kipsigis understood it, was not confined to the members of the Talai clans, but could be practised by any person. Witchcraft was believed to require skills which could be learned, and although in certain cases it was thought to pass through the lineage, in general it was not considered hereditary.9 Some orkoiik were recognized practitioners of witchcraft, but this was seen as being distinct from their potential to hold greater powers as members of an orkoiik clan. Orkoiik could be witches, but witches who were not members of the specific orkoiik clans could not be orkoiik: and there were believed to be many such people. To Kalenjin, witchcraft and the practices of the orkoiyot were two quite distinct phenomena. The important point here is that colonial debate about the prevalence of witchcraft and the activities of the orkoiik assumed the two categories to be synonymous. From the perspective of the Christian missionary churches, who entered the Western Highlands in the early years of this century, both were pagan and represented elements of African belief to which Christianity was implacably opposed: in the missionary mind the orkoiik were, like witches, practitioners of the black arts.10 A further confusion of terms must be explained. Throughout the colonial period male members of the Talai clan among the Kipsigis were referred to by Europeans as ' laibon' rather than 'orkoiyot'. The activities of the Kipsigis laibon were, in general terms, identical to those of the Nandi orkoiik. However, laibon is the name given to a category of ritual expert among the Maasai (the word is from the Maa language, not Kalenjin), whose practices and social status are not the same as those of the Kalenjin orkoiyot. The confusion stems partly from the tendency of early colonial officials to use laibon as a generic term for ' ritual 8 Witchcraft
accusations were commonly used by district commissioners as the basis for 9 Huntingford, Nandi ojKenya, pp. 107-11; Orchardson, The Kipsigis, pp. 119-22. 10 Huntingford,
ibid. For an account of mission work among Kalenjin which deals with early GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 857 expert', and to give the role of such an individual pronounced political overtones: this generic was avoided in the case of Nandi, where the prolonged resistance to British conquest in which the orkoiik were involved gave the colonizer an early awareness of the precise Nandi term. At the same time, there is a strong historical connection between Kalenjin and Maasai ritual experts throughout the Rift Valley and Western Highlands, and this also contributed to the blurring of indigenous categories and types in British eyes.11 For the sake of simplicity, and also because (as we shall see) there are very good historical reasons for doing so, I shall hereafter refer to all these ritual experts among the Kipsigis and Nandi as orkoiik. This historical connection is essential to an understanding of the colonial history of the Kalenjin. During the second half of the nineteenth century the role of the orkoiik among some sections of the Kalenjin was 'overlaid' by aspects of Maasai laibon practice. Although ritual experts throughout East Africa were commonly identified with a particular community, that association was not necessarily bounded by notions of ethnicity: Maasai laibons, in particular, were widely consulted by non-Maa peoples during the nineteenth century.12 Some time during the 1860s a laibon named Barsabotwo (or Kapuso), from the Uas Nkishu Maasai (who had until then occupied the grazing lands of the plateau adjacent to Nandi country), came to prominence among the Nandi. Nandi oral histories date the emergence of a pre-eminent orkoiyot, with greater powers and gaining a wider constituency than had previously been the norm, to this event. Precisely what may have existed before this date, and how the role of the orkoiik may have been evolving at this time, we do not know: but the arrival of Barsabotwo - the embodiment perhaps of the intrusion of a broader wave of influences brought into Nandi by Uas Nkishu Maasai refugees, defeated and scattered after internecine squabbles with other Maasai herders - marks a watershed in Nandi perception of their recent history.13 The introduction of these influences among the Kipsigis came c. 1890, around the time that Kimnyole, according to some accounts Barsabotwo's grandson, was stoned to death by Nandi following a sequence of failed predictions: whatever the power of the lineage, the status of any orkoiyot depended upon performance. In the unsettled period surrounding Kimnyole's death, part of his family departed from Nandi and moved south to settle among Kipsigis. By the late 1890s one of this group, Kipchomber arap 11 J. L. Berntsen,
'Pastoralism, raiding and prophets: Maasailand in the nineteenth century' 12 J. L. Berntsen,
'The Maasai and the Inkidongi: prophets, followers and pastoralism in the 13 P. K. arap
Magut, 'The rise and fall of the Nandi Orkoiyot', in B. G. Mcintosh (ed.), 31-2 858 DAVID M. ANDERSON Koilege, one of Kimnyole's many sons, had emerged as the most prominent orkoiyot among the Kipsigis. At the same time, another of Kimnyole's sons, Koitalel arap Samoie, had come to prominence among Nandi. Whether Kipchomber and Koitalel were fictive or real kin to Kimnyole is a moot point, although sources from the early 1900s appear to confirm that they were perceived and presented as such then. As Nandi and Kipsigis prepared to encounter colonialism in the 1890s, the most prominent ritual experts among both peoples were therefore drawn from the same family: a lineage whose origins are widely attributed as being Maasai, and whose leading members are believed to have gradually recast the role of the orkoiyot to give themselves greater political power over the community.14 The extent of that power was established in the resistance of the Nandi to colonial conquest. Koitalel and Kipchomber The Nandi orkoiyot Koitalel arap Samoie is a hero of African resistance to colonialism in Kenya. His story is well known to most Kenyan schoolchildren today. Koitalel is portrayed as the military leader of the Nandi warriors in their stubborn and protracted resistance to British colonialism between 1896 and 1905.15 Having marshalled the Nandi and successfully held the colonial power at bay for more than a decade, over which time the Nandi endured several 'punitive' raids and two major military campaigns against them by the British, Koitalel's glorious struggle was brought to an end by treachery. With the Nandi and the British locked in a war of attrition in 1905, Koitalel met with a British officer, Captain Meinertzhagen, in a forest clearing under a flag of truce. Many accounts are given of what transpired in that clearing, but most are agreed in the simple fact that Meinertzhagen drew his revolver and shot Koitalel.16 In the weeks following this event Nandi resistance crumbled, and along with it the resistance of the Kipsigis, whom Koitalel's brother Kipchomber arap Koilege had allegedly been mustering to support the Nandi in 1905.17 The events following Koitalel's death are less well known, yet form a crucial element in understanding the internal struggles and divisions within Nandi and Kipsigis society over the colonial period. In establishing control of the 14 Ng'eny, 'Nandi
resistance', pp. 97-102; S. C. Lang'at, 'Some aspects of Kipsigis history 15 William R.
Ochieng', A history of Kenya
(Nairobi,
1985), pp. 94-5. A. T. Matson, The Nandi 16 Col. R.
Meinertzhagen, Kenya
diary igo2-o6 (Edinburgh,
1957), pp. 232-39, gives a 17 Matson, Nandi campaign, p. 12. GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 859 Nandi and Kipsigis areas, the British first dealt with those Nandi whom they believed to have been in league with Koitalel: some were executed, others deported and imprisoned.18 Then, believing the position held by the orkoiik among the Nandi and Kipsigis to be one of executive authority, they set about establishing the rudiments of the new administrative structure by appointing several orkoiik as colonial chiefs. Among these was Kipchomber arap Koilege.19 This placed the orkoiik in a position of authority over the community which had no precedent. Worse still, it neglected the subtle, ambiguous and sometimes contradictory nature of the relationship between these ritual experts and the main body of the Kalenjin. The orkoiik were both feared and respected, for their powers could be exploitative just as they could be exploited. They were therefore deliberately kept at a distance from the community, socially and politically, their power having no role in the running of day-to-day affairs, their public authority confined to specific ritual functions. Indeed, the power of these ritual experts was in some senses 'external' to the Kalenjin community, deliberately cordoned off: the orkoiik lay beyond the moral codes governing social behaviour, operating within a quite separate moral sphere defined by their own special status. For the Maasai the ambiguity of the relationship between the laibon and the community has been summed up in a subtle observation that is equally apposite for the Kalenjin orkoiik: Maasai could not live with the laibon, but nor could they live without him.20 Like the Maasai laibon, the orkoiik only came into a closer relation to the wider community at what might be termed liminal phases, especially those linked to the passage of age-sets and the organization of initiation ceremonies, at which prominent orkoiik presided. Even in these deeply significant affairs, the role of orkoiik was complementary to, yet also in conflict with, the authority of the elders. This conflict was most apparent in relation to male generational tensions surrounding the acquisition of cattle and wives. Around the time of initiation, young men hoped to begin to acquire cattle of their own, which would mark the beginnings of herds which would provide the economic basis for their eventual marriage and the establishment of independent households. Elders within a family would commonly contribute to this process through various arrangements of loaning or bonding out cattle, but this naturally placed the elder in a position of considerable authority regarding the redistribution of wealth, and (by extension) over the ability of young men to marry and establish households. The orkoiik intervened in this process in two important respects: first, leading orkoiik were consulted over the timing of initiations, 18 More than a
dozen Nandi believed to be close associates of Koitalel were sentenced to five 19 C. M. Dobbs,
'Memorandum on the Lumbwa laibons', 12 May 1930, CO 533/441/1. 20 The phrase is
drawn from Paul Spencer, 'The diviner's oracle and the prophet's domain in 86o DAVID M. ANDERSON being able to effectively slow down or accelerate the passage of the age-set cycle (and thereby exert pressures on elders to redistribute wealth); and secondly, the powers of the orkoiik were invariably invoked by young men in the organization, sanctioning and conduct of cattle raids. Theft of cattle represented a means by which younger man might acquire wealth independently of the redistribution of the wealth of their immediate relatives. For services rendered in regard to cattle raids, orkoiik were rewarded with a share of the cattle seized, and so this was also an important element in the orkoiyofs own pattern of wealth accumulation. The orkoiik were thus placed in a strategic position in the mediation of generational conflicts concerning age-set transitions, and the social and economic transactions that followed in their wake: the balance between them and male elders was a delicate one. So it was that, by placing orkoiik in a position of administrative authority, the British had unwittingly turned the world of the Kalenjin on its head, undermining the authority vested in elders by the community and placing orkoiik in a position to challenge the accepted principles of moral order for their own advantage.21 It took the colonial administration some time to realize their mistake: it took the orkoiik among the Kipsigis no time at all to capitalize upon their unexpected opportunity. Although there was a steady trickle of complaints to the administration from Kipsigis elders from 1907 onwards about the excesses of those orkoiik appointed as chiefs, it was not until 1911 that the administration began to appreciate the enormity of their error. From 1912 onwards a number of orkoiik were removed from positions of authority, largely for failing to carry out government orders. Over the next two years groups of elders levelled a series of accusations of witchcraft against Kipchomber arap Koilege, claiming that he was plotting to turn the people against the government. In 1914 Kipchomber arap Koilege was tried under the witchcraft ordinance, along with several other orkoiik who had held the posts of chiefs and headmen. He was convicted and deported to Fort Hall, where he subsequently died.22 Shortly after Kipchomber arap Koilege had been taken away by the British a strange illness was reported to be sweeping through the Kipsigis reserve. The disease was named kusto, and it was said that people became suddenly feverish, and would writhe and agitate with severe sweats and acute swellings of the glands, and that within a few hours they would die. It was reported to the District Commissioner that hundreds were dead and dying in every location, and it was alleged that the disease had originated in the locality where Kipchomber arap Koilege had lived. Although the District Commissioner and the European doctor who rushed to Kericho found people who claimed to be 21 Huntingford, The
Nandi, pp. 38-52, offers a general discussion of the relations between
elders 22 The deportation
of Kipchomber and two other orkoiik, arap Boisio and arap Kiboyot, was GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 861 smitten, they could locate no visible symptoms; and though everyone spoken to claimed that many had died, no body was ever seen by a European. In his report on the incident, the District Commissioner concluded it to be a form of hysteria, and ventured to suggest that it was in some way connected to the deportation of Kipchomber arap Koilege. Later that same year, in the midst of a worsening drought, a group of Kipsigis petitioned the District Commissioner for the return of the orkoiyot, on the grounds that his removal was the cause of their present misfortunes.23 The history of the next twenty years in the Kipsigis reserve is dominated by the struggle for ascendancy between the orkoiik of the Talai clan and those elders who came to oppose them. The evidence of elders' complaints against the orkoiik suggests that 'opposition' took many forms. Some elders indicated the alien character of orkoiik practice among the Kipsigis since the arrival of Kipchomber in the 1890s, and argued for their expulsion back to the Nandi reserve: others reacted against the subversion of' tradition' displayed by the encroachment by the orkoiik into the domain of civil authority; others tied their fortunes to those of their new colonial masters, and opposed the orkoiik simply as enemies of law and order, following the ' official line'; others still became converts to Christianity, and viewed the orkoiik as the pagan enemy in the struggle for 'hearts and minds'. On the other side were those who favoured the orkoiik. The motives of these people are less easy to characterize, but among them were certainly those who wished to perpetuate Kalenjin resistance to colonialism and also those who saw the orkoiik (rightly or wrongly) as protectors of an older and preferred social order. There were also certainly many who supported the orkoiik out of fear and a genuine belief that they held the power - whether natural or supernatural - to inflict real harm and misfortune. The patterns of motive, loyalties and patronage were made all the more complex by the various transformations that had occurred in the role and functions of the orkoiik between the 1860s and 1910s - first by the intrusion of a Maasai element in the nineteenth century, then by the experience of resistance to colonial conquest, and again by the early ' alliance' with colonial authority.24 The tensions this generated within the community were therefore novel, a product of recent 'crises'. But it would be wrong to label these conflicts in simple terms of collaboration and resistance: the orkoiik stood at the centre of the battle to redefine the moral order, to establish a new social consensus in a transformed world. We can follow that struggle through the careers of leading orkoiik during the colonial period. 23 Acting provincial commissioner [PC] Nyanza to chief secretary, 4 May
1935, quoting from 862 DAVID M. ANDERSON Barserion arap Kimanye The struggle between the authority of the elders and the power of the orkoiik emerged among the Nandi in the months following KoitalePs death, but the ramifications took longer to penetrate the consciousness of the colonial administration than in Kipsigis. The reasons for this seem clear enough. Several leading Nandi orkoiik had been killed in the fighting of 1905, and others had subsequently been deported by the government. Of those who had survived, some had dispersed to other parts of the Western Highlands, and only a rump remained in Nandi.25 Defeated and depleted by the events of 1905-6, the Nandi orkoiik were in no position at that time to challenge the authority of their new colonial masters. As among the Kipsigis, the British initially sought to govern the Nandi through their orkoiik, appointing KoitalePs erstwhile rival, Kipeles, as chief.26 Kipeles held his colonial post, though to little effect, until his death in September 1911. The British then appointed Lelimo arap Samoie, a son of Koitalel, as chief, in the belief that they were honouring local 'custom' in maintaining authority in the lineage. This was a grave error ofjudgement: Lelimo was little respected by the Nandi, his powers thought to be very limited in comparison to his brothers and half-brothers.27 Upon the death of Kipeles, in 1911, the power of the orkoiik among the Nandi had sunk to a low point, and a small group of elders were already emerging as conspicuous allies of the British in their role as chiefs and headmen. By 1918 it seemed to the colonial administration that the power of the orkoiik was a thing of the past, and that the Nandi were slowly settling down 'to an orderly way of life' under the pax britannica.28 This optimistic outlook was soon overshadowed by a very serious challenge to colonial authority among the Nandi. The challenge was led by an orkoiyot named Barserion arap Kimanye, the youngest son of Koitalel. Resident as a 'squatter' on a European farm just north of the Nandi reserve, Barserion lay beyond the authority of the Nandi elders and beyond the immediate control of the District Commissioner at Kapsabet in the Nandi reserve.29 Following Kipeles' death, he emerged unrivalled as the most prominent Nandi orkoiyot. By 1920 the colonial officers in Nandi viewed him with suspicion: the initiation of a new age-set was imminent, and it was rumoured that Barserion was deeply involved in the growing number of stock thefts from settler farms near the Nandi reserve, and that he had sworn vengeance on the colonial government for his father's murder.30 Barserion had reason enough to oppose the colonial government, but by the early 1920s unrest among the Nandi was widespread, and it was by no means 25 'Nandi political prisoners, 1905-14', KNA AG4/4995. 26 Huntingford, The Nandi, p. 25. 27 Ibid. p. 52; Huntingford, 'The genealogy', p. 24. 28 Nandi District Annual Report, 1918-19. 29 Castle-Smith to
Senior Commissioner [SC], Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923, 'Report on Nandi 30 Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 5 Oct. 1923, KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11. GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 863 all instigated by the orkoiyot. The years following the end of the first world war were a difficult period among the Nandi. Influenza took its toll of the human population, and stock diseases swept through the cattle herds. At the same time, the colonial government increased its demands for taxes and improved its system of collection, compelling more Nandi to take employment on the European-owned farms on the Uasin Gishu plateau, along the northern border of the Nandi reserve.31 Most serious of all, in 1920 the government alienated a further 100 square miles of the Nandi reserve in the Kipkarren valley to provide farms for Europeans under the post-war Soldier Settlement Scheme, and permitted further land grants to Europeans in the Kaimosi area. In 1906 the Nandi had lost substantial grasslands in the Songhor area as part of their punishment for resistance, and the alienations of 1920 further restricted the grazing land available to several pororoisiek (territorial units, based on clans). Many Nandi viewed this as a hostile act on the part of government, and by 1921 it was apparent that the Nandi were again becoming 'disaffected'.32 Although he was not entirely the source of this 'disaffection', Barserion became its focus.33 During 1932 Nandi elders petitioned the District Commissioner on the subject of the ceremony of saket-ap-eito, an important ritual in the transition from one age-set to another. According to Nandi 'custom' (as presented at the time), this ceremony involved a gathering of all the murran of a single age-set under the guardianship of senior elders, but presided over by the most prominent orkoiyot.^ Although the saket-ap-eito should be held every 14 years or so, no ceremony had been conducted since before the troubles of 1905, and an unusually large body of men awaited initiation, many of them much older than would normally be expected. Nandi elders earnestly pressed upon the administration the urgency of the situation. Adopting an attitude of non-interference, the administration permitted the organization of the ceremony to go ahead. Barserion arap Kimanye was to officiate, and it was proposed to hold the ceremony on the European farm where he then resided.35 In the months leading up to the saket-ap-eito, the authority of the elders diminished, giving way to the influence of the orkoiyot. 'Lawlessness' among the Nandi increased markedly, particularly the incidence of stock theft by the Nyongi age-set, who were preparing to participate in the ceremony. Settlers were quick to report these thefts, and also to comment upon what they perceived as the growing 'truculence' of the younger Nandi men. The realization that most of the Nandi labour from the settler farms on the Uasin 31 Diana Ellis,
'The Nandi protest of 1923 in the context of African resistance to colonial
rule 32 Huntingford, The Nandi, pp. 41-2. 33 Ellis, 'The Nandi protest', remains the only detailed study of these events. 34 Huntingford, Southern Mlo-Hamites, pp. 31-2. 35 For a detailed
account of administrative actions concerning the saket-ap-eito see
Castle-Smith 864 DAVID M. ANDERSON Gishu plateau would be absent for three days to attend the ceremony raised a further crop of complaints.36 More seriously, rumours began to circulate the European farms and the Nandi reserve that the ceremony was to be the signal for a rebellion, led by Barserion arap Kimanye, to take back the Nandi lands from the Europeans and to avenge the death of Koitalel. With this intelligence, the gathering of several hundred Nandi men on a farm in the midst of the European settler community began to take on a distinctly sinister appearance in the eyes of European officials.37 Uncertain of Barserion's intentions, and of the reliability of their own intelligence network, the administration dallied. Finally, only four days before the ceremony was due, Barserion and four elders who had been prominent in the organization of the gathering were arrested by the District Commissioner, accompanied by a detachment of armed police. A week later, the orkoiyot was brought before the magistrate at Eldoret, and sentenced to be deported to Nyeri, in the Kikuyu area of central Kenya.38 Unlike the 1914 disturbances among the Kipsigis, which had seen a group of elders emerge in direct conflict with the orkoiik, the 1923 troubles in Nandi appear to have united a broad spectrum of Nandi society behind the orkoiyot and against the government. The driving force behind this was not the orkoiyot himself, but the resentments that still lingered over the injuries of a war then still strong in the memory, and the continuation of what seemed to be further punitive measures in the further land alienations of 1920. The road to Gwassi With the deportation of Barserion arap Kimanye the administration had, for the time being, gained the upper hand in the struggle against the Kalenjin orkoiik. Or so it seemed. However, in Barserion's absence, his Kipsigis cousins (the sons and nephews of his uncle Kipchomber arap Koilege) mounted a challenge of their own to the authority of the colonial government. To place the actions of the Kipsigis orkoiik in context, we must first briefly consider the manner in which the colonial government sought to enforce law and order among the Kalenjin during the 1920s and 1930s. Stock theft was the crime with which the Kalenjin were most closely associated in the eyes of the government.39 It had long been understood by the colonial administration that the orkoiik were involved in stock thefts. Their role in sanctioning and blessing pre-colonial cattle raiding by murran had continued in a modified form 36 Ibid. p. 2; J.
J. Drought to SC Kisumu, 4 Oct. 1923; and Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 37 Capt. Slade
Hawkins to Castle-Smith, 22 Oct. 1923, 'Nandi unrest'; 'Statements regarding 38 Barserion was
arrested on 16 October. Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 17 Oct. 1923, KNA 39 The following
section is based on David M. Anderson, 'Stock theft and moral economy in CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 865 in the colonial period, although the practice of large-scale raiding had ended. For his ritual and practical assistance in the organization of thefts and the disposal or secretion of stolen animals, an orkoiyot stood to make considerable personal gain, in the form of livestock and other tribute; and there was evidence that some orkoiik actively encouraged theft as a means of accumulating wealth for themselves. The inability of Kalenjin elders to stamp out cattle rustling by the murran came to be viewed by the colonial administration as confirmation of the general acquiescence of the wider Kalenjin community in such crimes: the Kalenjin considered stock theft to be a 'sport' rather than a crime, it was alleged. The thrust of colonial sanction against stock theft was accordingly aimed at cultivating a community morality against the criminal activities of the murran. In prosecutions against stock thieves, or against those believed to have aided them, the colonial authorities frequently invoked collective punishments: that is, the punishment of the wider community for the offence of one of its members.40 For example, the residents of a particular location might be collectively fined if stolen livestock were found within the location boundaries, the assumption being that they knew the animals were there and should have reported the matter. The enforcement of collective punishments had two broad effects: firstly, in bringing pressure to bear on chiefs and headmen to discourage stock theft, it pushed them into direct conflict with those orkoiik who were actively involved in - and benefiting from - the activities of the murran; secondly, it pushed the orkoiik and the stock thieves into a more highly organized system of' rings' in order to avoid detection and transfer stolen stock without implicating local Kalenjin communities. The colonial challenge to the involvement of the orkoiik in stock theft was therefore moral as well as legal. It sought to turn the community, and especially the chiefs, against the orkoiik and their agents. As the colonial authorities stepped up the enforcement of legislation against stock theft during the 1920s, these tensions became more apparent, especially among the Kipsigis. Matters came to a head in the middle of 1928, and rumbled through the next year. The transition of the Kipsigis' Maina age-set was then imminent, a phase when (as we have seen) the orkoiik could exploit their closest relationship with, and greatest influence over, the murran}1In 1928 this coincided with a serious and prolonged drought, which increased still further the spate of stock thefts that officials had now come to expect when age-set transitions were due. But as the drought worsened, in July and August 1929, Kipsigis' 'lawlessness' took a different, and unexpected form: a series of arson 40 The collective
punishments ordinance (1909) and the stock and produce theft ordinance 41 Orchardson, The
Kipsigis, p. 12. Dobbs, 'Memorandum on the Lumbwa laibons', 12 May 866 DAVID M. ANDERSON attacks began on the property of Africans in the Kipsigis reserve. Huts and grain stores were set alight, and on several occasions these acts were clearly intended to endanger life. As the months passed the attacks appeared to take on a pattern: they were concentrated in those locations where the administration had been most successful in its efforts to suppress stock theft, and the principal victims were those colonial chiefs, their headmen and retainers, who were known to have informed against stock thieves or to have spoken out against the orkoiik}2 These attacks brought the covert struggle between the elders and the orkoiik, which had simmered since the deportation of Kipchomber arap Koilege in 1914, into the open. Elders once again began to seek the assistance of the administration against the orkoiik. Prominent among these elders were early participants in the Christian churches that were then being established among the Kipsigis. We do not know enough about the discussions that took place among Kipsigis elders over this crucial period, and it would be unwise to view this as reflecting what might be termed a climate of'popular opinion' among the Kipsigis, but it appears that some individuals elected to take a stand against the orkoiik. In coming forward to give evidence to the district commissioner, several elders requested that the orkoiik be removed from the reserve, on the grounds that their influence was' evil' and that they should be removed back to Nandi or Maasailand, from where they had come.43 Disturbed by the challenge to the authority of the chiefs, and concerned to reduce stock theft and subdue the crescendo of European settler complaints about the 'lawless Kipsigis', the administration mounted an investigation into the activities of the orkoiik. The evidence accumulated by District ComÂmissioner Brumage led to the conviction and imprisonment of several orkoiik for their involvement in stock theft, and gave a clearer picture of the extent of orkoiik activity in the 'handling' of stolen animals. In a reassertion of colonial authority, a military levy force patrolled the Kipsigis reserve for 18 months to maintain law and order, paid for by increased taxation. With the support of his provincial commissioner, C. M. Dobbs (who had considerable experience of Kipsigis), Brumage went so far as to suggest that the entire clan should be removed from the Kipsigis reserve, presenting signed affidavits from several elders and chiefs to indicate that this was the wish of the people. But the 42 Beresford-Stooke
to PC Nyanza, 15 Oct. 1929, KNA PC/NZA.3/32/39. The police were 43 The inquiry into
these events was conducted by DC Beresford-Stooke, assisted by the district GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 867 suggestion was rejected as being too extreme a reaction to what were perceived by most officials as simply the activities of a few criminal types.44 With the presence of the military patrol things were quieter in the Kipsigis locations over 1930 and the early part of 1931. Thereafter the situation rapidly deteriorated. The normal pattern of stock thefts again spiralled, but crimes of a new character became more common: thefts of cash, items of high value, firearms and ammunition from settlers and government officers. In the last months of 1933 there was a rash of attacks on settler farms, in which two settlers in Lumbwa were physically injured, and a substantial number of guns stolen.45 In response to settler criticism and rumours of Kipsigis 'insurrection', and with a growing sense of unease at the pattern of events, the administration mounted a second investigation into crime among the Kipsigis, bringing back District Commissioner Brumage to conduct the inquiry.46 Over several months of 1934, Brumage interviewed Kipsigis chiefs and elders, detained and interrogated all the more important orkoiik, and reviewed the material collected in the district files. Playing one orkoiyot against another, exploiting the rivalries between individuals (and often pretending he knew more than he did), and coaxing the elders into believing that it would be safe to speak out against the orkoiik, Brumage began to assemble a fragmentary, but fascinating picture of recent events. His final report made a quite startling set of revelations about the extent of organized crime among the orkoiik, and its connection with anti-government activities.47 Several elements of this report are strikingly problematic, but highly suggestive of the nature of the conflicts within Kipsigis society at this time. Many of the principal informants were young Kipsigis who had very recently come under the influence of Christian missionaries; others were beleaguered chiefs and elders, victimized by the orkoiik and pressured by the colonial administration; at least one was a member of the Talai clan, whose immediate family was involved in a long-standing dispute with other leading orkoiik}8 Above all else, the tone of the evidence assembled by Brumage conveys a very real sense of the tension and deeply rooted fear that surrounded the revelation of these events for those involved. The evidence presented in Brumage's report clearly requires careful assessment, both for what it can tell us about Kalenjin society in this period and for what it tells us about the colonial mind. Brumage was not a policeman, but his report was compiled in much the same manner 44 On the levy
force, see commissioner of police to DC Kericho, 19 Oct. 1929, and related 45 Relevant
correspondence on these events is to be found in 'Law and order: Lumbwa 46 Montgomery to colonial secretary, 8 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115. 47 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 19 April 1934, KNA AG3/29. 48 Crucial evidence
was provided by Kibinot arap Rongoe, an orkoiyot whose family were 868 DAVID M. ANDERSON that any detective might draw together the strands of a case. Perhaps, over keen to make connections and see patterns in the morass of detail, Brumage may be guilty of having laid too much stress upon the degree to which the activities of the orkoiik were orchestrated by powerful individuals. All the same, it is quite clear that, whether individually or collectively, the orkoiik were deeply involved in what Brumage termed 'criminal activities'-the theft of property from both Africans and Europeans, along with actions which colonial law determined as forms of extortion. Brumage also gave these matters a political slant, accusing the leading orkoiik of plotting a rising against the state. Thus, the colonial view of the orkoiik tarnished them at once as criminal accumulators - lining their own pockets - and as subversive rebels, holding a political purpose against the legitimacy of colonial authority. The burden of the evidence gathered by Brumage indicated that the Kipsigis orkoiik were at the head of a sophisticated and well-organized criminal network, operating throughout the Western Highlands. Several informants alluded to a meeting of orkoiik that had allegedly taken place in the Buret area of the Kipsigis reserve some time during 1928.49 Some presented this meeting as an effort to resolve a power struggle between rival orkoiik families. If Brumage's recounting of this information is correct, the resolution of the struggle was found in cooperation rather than conflict. The meeting would seem to have had two principal outcomes: first, it defined a group of confederates among the orkoiik who stood in direct opposition to government (the arson attacks in the Kipsigis reserve apparently began in the wake of this meeting), and who agreed to accumulate resources with which to mount a future rebellion; secondly, it seems that the eight leading orkoiik agreed upon a division of territory, each identifying a 'domain' over which he had control. This territorial division extended over the entire Western Highlands, incorporating the lands of other Kalenjin groups and extensive areas of European settlement. Brumage described these territories as 'fiefdoms'.50 The eight orkoiik who were the principal parties of this agreement - the 'Big Eight', as colonial officials came to call them - were all closely related. Brumage went to considerable trouble to reconstruct a family tree for these orkoiik, taxing each of his informants as to the precise relationships of individuals and collecting details of orkoiik wives and their numbers of children. His findings may not be biologically accurate (fictive kin may well be presented as real kin), but the evidence is strong to support the view that these relationships reflect Kipsigis perceptions. Four of the 'Big Eight' were identified as sons of Kipchomber arap Koilege: Ngasura arap Chomber, Kiboin arap Sitonik, Sauli arap Mibei, and Kiberenge arap Toinge. Another, Marumah arap Bore, was Kipchomber's nephew. The remaining three, the brothers Chebuchuk arap Boigut and Telile arap Boigut, and Muneria arap Tonui, were cousins of Kipchomber arap Koilege (see Fig. 2).51 All of these 49 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, p. 8. 50 See KNA
PC/NZA.3/15/117 for a detailed map outlining the ' fiefdoms' controlled by each GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA Barsabotwo (Kapuso) 869
Kipsokon Kibogui ~ Turugat I Marasoi
arap Sokon Chomber a. Koilagen Kimnyole ---- râ Kiboigut Tonni a. Bosiek
Chebuchuk a. Boigut Telile a. Boigut Muneria a. Tonui
Kipchomber a. Koilege Kisanoi Ogui Koitalel a. Samoei Kibore
Baserion a. Kimanye 1 Lelimo Marumah a. Bore Ngasura Kiboin Sauli Kiberenge a. Chomber a. Sitonik a. Mibei a. Toinge Fig. 2. Genealogy of the orkoiik. men were found to be deeply involved in 'criminal activities', and each was alleged to be at the head of a network of'lesser orkoiik' who were also involved in crime. The networks of agents were found to include at least two chiefs, several location headmen and a number of other government employees.52 The eventual list of charges against each of the eight, along with several of their accomplices, was long. Marumah arap Bore was found in possession of three rifles and a quantity of ammunition, all hidden in a cave. Chebuchuk arap Boigut was also found to have stolen weapons and ammunition, and several valuable jewels stolen from a settler farm were recovered from his hut. Muneria arap Tonui was found to be responsible for a wide range of crimes in the Nakuru and Rumuruti districts (and was later to be strongly suspected of involvement in the 'Kinangop Outrage'). Most serious of all, Kiboin arap Sitonik was in possession of no fewer than eight firearms, including three -303 magazine rifles (one of which had been stolen from the police in 1929), and a Martini-Henry rifle that had been stolen from a forest department official in 1928. A further four orkoiik were found to be hiding other stolen weapons and ammunition. Numerous charges relating to old stock theft cases were also brought against many orkoiik. Where less concrete evidence could be found, charges were made under the witchcraft ordinance. As a result of the investigations of 1934 more than a dozen orkoiik were imprisoned, with hard labour, for terms of between one and five years.53 52 Ibid. pp. 9-11; also, Brumage to PC Nyanza, 19 April 1934, KNA AG3/29. 53 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA
PC/NZA.3/15/115, pp. 4-7; Byrne to Cunliffe- 870 DAVID M. ANDERSON Portraying the orkoiik as the ' evil' and disruptive force among the Kipsigis, whose powerful influence was based upon intimidation and the fear of witchcraft, Brumage reiterated his earlier recommendation for the wholesale deportation of the entire Talai clan from the Kipsigis reserve. The legal and moral objections that had been raised to so extreme a measure in 1930 now melted away: the extent of Talai involvement in crime and witchcraft had been substantively documented, and the alleged intention of the orkoiik to mount a rebellion gave these events a deeper significance than had been apparent four years earlier. In May 1934, with the strong support of other senior administrators, and no doubt conscious of settler anxiety about the situation in the Western Highlands, the attorney general drafted legislation to provide for the mass deportation of the orkoiik clan, and forwarded it to London for approval.54 While this extraordinary and unprecedented proposal was under conÂsideration at the colonial office, Alex Semini was murdered. The 'Kinangop Outrage' was soon rumoured to be yet another example of the activities of Kipsigis 'gangsters', a rumour given some substance by evidence gathered which implicated the orkoiyot Muneria arap Tonui, who, it was claimed, had given 'blessings' to the eight burglars before their raid on the Semini farm. Lingering doubts in London and Nairobi about the propriety of the proposed legislation dissipated in the weeks following the 'Kinangop Outrage'.55 On 25 September 1934, the day after seven Kipsigis had been found guilty in the high court of the murder of Alex Semini, the Laibons Removal Ordinance (no. 32 of 1934) was added the laws of Kenya (Cap. 46).56 Over the following three years, all members of the Talai clan, men, women and children - more than 700 persons in all - were removed, with a portion of their livestock and other possessions, to the Gwassi location in South Nyanza, where the bulk of them were to remain, under direct supervision, until the mid-1950s.57 The official record of this forced migration portrays the removal of the orkoiik as marking the welcome end of tyranny in the Kipsigis reserve and the restoration of the 'traditional' authority of the elders. There were certainly some Kipsigis who viewed events in these terms, but not all shared this sense of well-being. Aside from the involvement of orkoiik in organized crime, members of the Talai clan were recognized and respected practitioners of such arts as divining, rain-making and witch-finding: who would now perform 54 On the detailed
drafting of the ordinance, see Montgomery to chief secretary, 19 July 1934, 55 For discussion of the legislation in the colonial office, see CO 533/481/1. 56 For the Semini
case see criminal case 123 (1934), Rex v. Kibet arap Boregi and 6
others, CO 57 On the
selection of Gwassi see DC South Kavirondo to PC Nyanza, 27 March 1934, and GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 871 these mundane, but essential social functions? The departure of the orkoiik left a vacuum which the aspiring Christian churches were not yet in a position to fill. The position of the churches was strengthened after 1935, but the power and influence of the orkoiik lingered on. On many occasions the administration uncovered evidence of attempts by Kipsigis to contact the orkoiik at Gwassi, seeking to employ their services for ritual purposes.58 While the departure of the orkoiik was welcomed by some, it marked an immediate social crisis of significant proportions for others: towards the end of 1935, following the imprisonment of several leading orkoiik and the beginnings of the deportations to Gwassi, the strange illness known as kusto was once again reported to be sweeping through the Kipsigis reserve. This time the administration were more confident in asserting that this was nothing more than a minor outbreak of cerebral meningitis, but the district commissioner stated plainly that many Kipsigis saw this as part of the revenge to be exacted by the orkoiik.59 ' The promised land' With the Kipsigis wing of the family removed from the Western Highlands, let us return to the story of Barserion arap Kimanye and the Nandi. Accused of witchcraft and revolt, Barserion had been exiled to central Kenya in 1923. In his absence, the Nandi had continued to consult other orkoiik- some of whom continued to be actively involved in the encouragement of stock theft - on divinatory and other matters.60 Although the Nandi orkoiik remained a threat to progress and to law and order in the eyes of the administration, there is no evidence that their opposition to the policies of the colonial government took the same form as among the Kipsigis. Certainly, by the late 1920s none of the Nandi orkoiik had achieved a reputation to match that of the exiled son of Koitalel. In 1929 the district commissioner reported that 'certain Nandi elders' were petitioning for the return of Barserion. The reason for their request was stated to be the seriousness of the drought then afflicting the Nandi reserve, the elders hoping that the restoration of the orkoiyot might restore the fortunes of the people. This argument seems to have been accepted by the administration, and Barserion was permitted to return to Nandi, where he was compelled to live at the government town of Kapsabet, under the watchful eye of the district 58 For example,
Kiboin arap Sitonik and Muneria arap Tonui, two of the 'Big Eight' who were 59 Dr Howell to DC
Kericho, 'A mysterious disease among the natives of south Lumbwa 60 See 'Laibons and
deportees, 1927-35', KNA DC/NDI/4/1, for monthly intelligence reports 872 DAVID M. ANDERSON commissioner.61 But it also seems likely that the request for Barserion's return was part of a wider conflict within Nandi society, between those who wished to restore the orkoiik to the prominence they had enjoyed in the recent past and those who did not. Among other evidence, this is indicated by events that followed Barserion's homecoming in 1930 when, within a few months of his return, another group of elders (including a number of recent Christian converts) complained to the district commissioner that the orkoiyot was 'practising witchcraft'. Although the district commissioner found insufficient evidence to support this accusation, similar claims were reiterated at intervals throughout the 1930s. It is certain that all the Christian churches in Nandi viewed Barserion as an evil and potentially dangerous influence. For his own part, Barserion undoubtedly continued to ply his trade over this period, but there is no evidence that his activities mounted a serious challenge to the government, or to the Nandi chiefs. None the less, his presence remained a focus of attention for those elders and (increasingly) chiefs who sought to reduce the power and influence of the orkoiik among the Nandi.62 Barserion was to commit one final act, however, that brings our story full circle. In the late 1940s the question of land again became a critical political issue in the Nandi reserve, following the decision of the settler-controlled district councils of Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia to repatriate the majority of the Nandi squatters and their livestock to the Nandi reserve. The squatters were resident labourers, living and working on farms in the European-settled areas to the north and east of the Nandi reserve. Many squatter families had resided on these lands since before 1920, but they were treated under the law as tenants-at-will and thereby had no rights. The agreement by which most worked for the Europeans permitted them to graze a stipulated number of their cattle on the farm. In the early days of European settlement this system had evolved as an essential element in securing labour - without grazing rights, Nandi simply would not work the farms. By the 1940s the economic position of the farms had changed, and the majority of European landowners (though by no means all) desired to move towards a better-defined system of contract labour and to remove African-owned livestock from their lands in order to implement fuller development on the farms and to remove the risk of the spread of stock diseases.63 After considerable debate, and a good deal of persuasion from the 61 Barserion
returned to Nandi in May 1930, after requests from the elders; DC Nandi to PC 62 'Law and order:
Barserion arap Kimanye, 1932-39', KNA PC/RVP/6A/17/27, for 63 On the squatter
system in general, the best account remains Roger van Zwanenberg, Colonial GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 873 government, the Nandi chiefs agreed to accept the returning squatters back into the reserve and to supervise the ' reabsorption' of thousands of head of cattle. Part of the government plan to accomplish this involved a land clearance and resettlement scheme in the Nandi reserve and the compulsory sale of stock that was surplus to the calculated carrying capacity of the available land, along with the compulsory branding of all stock to be repatriated to the reserve. All of this implied more people and livestock within the Nandi reserve, and greater direction from government as to the use of their land.64 Barserion, by then an old man, entered the political debate on these questions, predictably taking the side of those returning squatters who seemed likely to lose their livestock and be made landless in this process of change. After an abortive campaign in 1951, as the main process of repatriation got under way, to persuade the squatters to march back to the farms and 'repossess' the land, Barserion again seemed to disappear from the political arena. At this time government energies were diverted by the Mau Mau emergency, and the removal of Kikuyu labour from farms throughout many parts of Kenya created openings for Nandi squatters then being repatriated from the Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia farms.65 This lessened the pressures of absorbing so many people and livestock back into the reserve, and lowered the political temperature, albeit temporarily. It was not until May 1957, with the Mau Mau emergency in its fourth year, that Barserion arap Kimanye made what was to be his final bid to avenge the death of his father, Koitalel. In the early months of 1957 the district intelligence reports began to mention that Barserion was again active. His supporters had been seen travelling about the reserve and, mysteriously, several of them had made visits to Nandi squatters on the Laikipia Escarpment, on the eastern side of the Rift Valley.66 Nandi had only gone to Laikipia as squatters in any numbers during the Mau Mau emergency, replacing Kikuyu labour on the farms. Many Nandi expelled from Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia had made their way to Laikipia instead of returning to the overcrowded Nandi reserve. They had done this with the tacit knowledge of the administration, who viewed this strictly illegal procedure as neatly ameliorating their difficulties in accommodating more people in the Nandi reserve and solving the problems of labour shortage in those areas of Kenya where Kikuyu labour had predominated.67 64 On the planning,
implementation and political repercussions of the scheme to repatriate 65 DC Kericho to DC
Nandi, 15 Jan. 1955, KNA DC/NDI/5/3, for details of special branch 66 Acting PC Rift
Valley to DC Nandi, 27 April 1957, KNA DC/NDI/5/3; DC Thomson's 67 Acting PC Rift Valley to secretary for African affairs, 1 May 1957, KNA DC/NDI/6/1. 874 DAVID M. ANDERSON From the evidence of Nandi who took part in the events of 1956 and from the intelligence on his activities gathered by the government, it appears that Barserion's scheme was to lead a rebellion of the Nandi squatters on Laikipia who, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the British with Mau Mau, would turn on the European settlers, kill them, and claim Laikipia as the Nandi's 'Promised Land'.68 The killing of Koitalel would thus be avenged and, symbolically at least, the lands taken from the Nandi as punishment for the resistance led by Koitalel would be restored. On the day prior to the planned insurrection Barserion and a group of his supporters were arrested on the road between Kapsabet and Laikipia. On the next day the police rounded up a large number of Nandi squatters in the fringes of the Marmanet Forest, on the western edge of Laikipia. They also confiscated over 5,000 newly made arrows and large quantities of freshly prepared poisons.69 Protest and resistance in Kenyan historiography Barserion arap Kimanye was once again deported in 1957, this time to Mfangano Island in Lake Nyanza, where he remained until 1961.70 His kinsmen among the Kipsigis were allowed to return from Gwassi to the Kipsigis reserve from the mid-1950s, where those orkoiik suspected of anti-government or criminal activities were kept under close watch. By then the influence of Kipchomber's immediate family was much diminished within the clan, many of the children were attending school and some had embraced Christianity. Back among Kipsigis, the orkoiik resumed many of their social functions as diviners, and it may be assumed that some continued to maintain an interest in stock theft: but there was no significant political disturbance involving the orkoiik in the last years of colonial rule.71 By the eve of Kenya's independence in 1963, it would appear that the civil authority of the elders, bolstered by the colonial state, had ultimately triumphed over the orkoiik. But that is too simple a conclusion: the pattern of gains and losses was more complex, and requires a more cautious and ambivalent assessment. 68 Barserion's
intentions and plans are described fully, from intelligence reports, in DC
Laikipia 69 'Armed
uprising by Nandi squatters averted', East African Standard (14 May
1957). Nandi 70 PC Rift Valley
to DC Nandi, 29 July 1957, KNA DC/KAPT/1/9/25. Two of Barserion's 71 The decision
to allow younger orkoiik to return to Kipsigis was taken in 1947, see
minute by GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 875 Kalenjin orkoiik have taken up a surprising and symbolically significant position in the evolving historiography of Kenya since the 1960s. This historiography has remained an arena for sharp political controversy, within which highly divergent views of Kenya's past are contested. The theme of resistance dominates this discourse, both of African resistance to colonial conquest and (more poignantly) African resistance in the Mau Mau emergency of the 1950s. The Mau Mau war was a struggle which divided Africans in Kenya among themselves, even dividing those Kikuyu comÂmunities who were at its centre. These divisions were not an accidental product of the struggle, but were cultivated as a deliberate tactic: the British colonial government mobilized a Kikuyu home guard to combat Mau Mau, and were conspicuously successful in keeping groups other than Kikuyu out of the armed struggle.72 While many Kalenjin may have sympathized with the armed struggle, and some elements certainly organized themselves to support the Mau Mau land and freedom army, it remains true that the British, for very good reason, considered the Kalenjin to be the most loyal of all the peoples of Kenya during the 1950s.73 Moreover, whilst the Mau Mau fighters may be thought to have ultimately won the war even in military defeat - in so far as their activities can be seen to have dramatically altered the political landscape of Kenya and brought the end of imperial rule much faster than might otherwise have been the case - they did not win the peace. The spoils of war - political power in the independent Kenya - went not to the freedom fighters from the forests, or even to their commanders, but instead to the more liberal elements in the nationalist movement of the 1940s and 1950s, most of whom had argued throughout for constitutional settlement and remained, at best, ambivalent in their attitudes towards the armed struggle.74 The popular image of nationalist struggle that the state in independent Kenya has consistently promoted is predictably devoid of the contradictions implicit in this rendering of the historical evidence. The process of nation-building has required a simplistic picture of a glorious nationalist struggle during Mau Mau in which all Kenya peoples played a part.75 Yet with landlessness - the most fundamental aspect of the land and freedom army's charter - having not diminished in Kenya since independence, and with 72 Frank Furedi,
The Mau Mau war in perspective (London, 1989); Carl G. Rosberg and John 73 F. D.
Corfield, Historical survey of the origins and growth of Mau Mau, Cmd.
1030 (London, 74 Lonsdale,
'Mau Maus of the mind', passim; John Spencer, KAU: The Kenya African Union, 75 The most
obvious example remains Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without bitterness: the
founding of 876 DAVID M. ANDERSON politics continuing to be seen in largely local terms, the nationalist interpretation has been undermined by class-based and ethnocentric alternatives.76 None of this is very surprising, yet it emphasizes that resistance remains the most prominent yet also most problematic theme of Kenya's historiography. This brings us back to Koitalel, Kipchomber and Barserion, and the way in which they have been portrayed in writings on Kenya's past. In his widely read and highly praised novel Petals of Blood, Ngugi wa Thiong'o includes Barserion and Koitalel in his pantheon of true heroes of African resistance to colonialism, invoking their names as a plea for justice and right.77 This literary allusion reflects what might be considered the 'orthodox' view of many Kenyan-born historians. William Ochieng' has echoed this in his school and university textbooks written for Kenyan students, while Atieno Odhiambo has described Koitalel as 'the greatest of the resisters'.78 In another literary work, Homecoming, Ngugi praises Koitalel as the leader of a 'violent peasant resistance' against colonialism, and in his work Detained he applauds Barserion as a leading Mau Mau activist.79 In the only work to deal at any length with Kipchomber, Henry Mwanzi smears those who opposed the orkoiik as 'collaborators' with colonialism.80 To these writers, the orkoiik are heroic figures. All history needs its heroes and heroines, but it must also have its villains: and, depending upon your perspective, the same individuals may fulfil both roles. The orkoiik may be seen as heroes of resistance, yet they were also villains of the piece among Kalenjin, who feared their power and the role they came to assume in the years prior to and during colonialism. If we accept Koitalel, Kipchomber and Barserion simply as heroes of resistance, where does this leave the elders who stood against the power of the orkoiik? Are these individuals to be stigmatized as colonial stooges, collaborators with the imperial power, and thereby opponents of the forces of African nationalism? This question has much importance for the writing of Kenya's history, and for an analysis of present Kenyan politics. But the simplistic view of resistance and collaboration cannot begin to explain the social and moral process in which the elders' 'collaborative' search for a new order that kept material progress under household control was fundamentally opposed to the occult power of the orkoiik. The authority of the orkoiik was more appropriate to the 76 Maina wa Kinyatti (ed.), Thunder from the mountains: Mau Mau
patriotic songs (London, 1980); 78 Ochieng', History
of Kenya, pp. 94-5; E. S. Atieno Odhiambo, '"Mind limps after
reality": 79 Ngugi wa
Thiong'o, Homecoming: essays on African and Caribbean literature, culture
and politics 80 Henry Mwanzi, 'Koitalel arap Samoei', passim. GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 877 potentially violent entrepreneurial drive of livestock accumulation on the relatively open pasturage of pre-colonial times. Modern Kenya is the product of its collaborative elders who learned to exploit the state, with its new concepts of fixed household property and agricultural production. In essence, those who opposed the orkoiik in the Western Highlands have inherited the power of the colonial state:81 the parallels with the Mau Mau forest fighters are clear. But resistance has more meanings than Kenya's historiography presently reflects. 'Africa, after all', Ngugi reminds us, 'did not have one but several pasts which were in perpetual struggle'.82 This holds true as much for the history of the orkoiik within the context of Kalenjin social history as it does for the more generalized reconstructions of the history of resistance to colonialism in Kenya, but one can surely inform our understanding of the other. Despite their prominence in the heroic litany of resistance, the deeper social history of these actors and their actions has been woefully neglected. In this, and in many other respects, Kenya has many pasts yet to be fully explored. 81 For a splendid example see A. T. Matson,' Elijah Cheruiyot arap Chepkwony: a great Nandichief, in B. E. Kipkorir (ed.), Biographical essays on imperialism and collaboration in colonial Kenya (Nairobi, 1980), pp. 209-43.
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